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Remembering Louis Del Cotto
KENNETH F. JOYCEt
Louis A. Del Cotto and I were tax colleagues and
friends for over three decades. Our shared experiences were
consequently such that it is impossible in this short
memorial note to discuss at any length the multitude of his
talents and strengths. I will try, however, to give a brief
glimpse of him, as a teacher, a scholar, and a friend, in a
way that I think he would approve.
As a tax teacher and scholar, Louis Del Cotto was
driven by the wisdom of Justice Louis Brandeis' admonition
that, "[i]f we would guide by the light of reason, we must let
our minds be bold."1
To Lou, the Internal Revenue Code was, at least
presumptively, a coherent whole and the interrelationship
of its provisions was key, to be discovered and revealed,
even if only through merciless analysis. To take one of his
favorite classroom exercises, "Suppose," he would say, "that
a personal injury claimant received from a defendant as
damages not cash but property-say Blackacre-worth
$100,000. What would the plaintiffs "cost" basis be in
Blackacre in light of the fact that § 104(a)(2) of the Code
allowed the plaintiff to exclude Blackacre from gross
t SUNY Distinguished Teaching Professor of Law, University at Buffalo Law
School.
1. New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). The quotation was a favorite of a third Louis, Professor Louis L.
Jaffe, who had been a law clerk to Justice Brandeis in 1932. See Louis L. Jaffe,
Was Brandeis An Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 986, 992 (1967). Lou and I were both students of Prof. Jaffe (Lou-Torts-
Buffalo; myself-Administrative Law-Harvard), and Prof. Jaffe, who was the
Dean of the Buffalo Law School from 1948 to 1950, was instrumental in my
coming to Buffalo in 1964 (I seriously asked him, "Where's Buffalo?"). On
arrival, I taught Administrative Law and (at the "suggestion" of Dean Jack
Hyman) Gratuitous Transfers (then called Wills and Trusts). Lou, however, had
other plans for me and, in a few short years, he had captured my interests and
drafted me into tax, which, with Gratuitous Transfers, I have taught ever after.
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income? After all," he would say seductively, "if a primary
function of basis is to ensure that taxed receipts are not
taxed again and that untaxed receipts are eventually taxed
once, how could such a plaintiff have any cost basis at all,
given the § 104(a)(2) exclusion?"
And as the students would either begin to nod in assent
to the zero basis implication of Lou's question, or continue
to express their bewilderment, he would deliver the
message:
"But, if the plaintiffs basis in Blackacre is zero-
indeed-" he would boom, "if it is anything less than its
value of $100,000, then if Blackacre is immediately sold, the
plaintiff would have gross income on the sale-right? And if
that happened what would that do to the Congressional
exclusion policy behind §104(a)(2)?"
And so the students would begin to see-first, the
specific point that even though there was no statute or
regulation which set forth the proper result in haec verba,
the basis of the plaintiff had to be $100,000 to preserve and
carry out the Congressional purpose to forever exclude
damages for personal injury. And they also saw, without
having it dictated, the larger point that, although the
internal coherency of the Code is not always visible, it is
discoverable by reasoned analysis, if we "let our minds be
bold." And finally, perhaps most importantly, they saw that
tax was the proper business of law students, with the power
to excite and challenge the mind, and to satisfy its desire to
explore and discover.
It was that type of teaching by joint and mutual
discovery which endeared Lou to students, which sent many
of them off to become successful tax practitioners, and
which maintains their gratitude to this day.
In his tax scholarship, Lou exhibited the same striving
to analyze and reveal the underlying (albeit sometimes
counterintuitive) coherency of the Code. Examples abound,
but I pick one where, arguably like the Buffalo Bills (of
whom Lou was a devoted but critical fan), although he
should have gotten to wear a Super Bowl ring in public, he
had to be satisfied with the fact that, for those who know
better, he deserved one.
My reference is to a question that has baffled tax people
over the years-the proper way for an income tax system to
treat non-recourse debt. It starts with an analysis of why
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we allow taxpayers to exclude borrowed money to begin
with. It continues into the various approaches to dealing
with non-payment of previously excluded borrowing. At its
apex, it reached the Supreme Court in the Tufts case in the
form of the following question:
Over 35 years ago, in Crane v. Commissioner, this Court ruled that
a taxpayer, who sold property encumbered by a nonrecourse
mortgage (the amount of the mortgage being less than the
property's value), must include the unpaid balance of the mortgage
in the computation of the amount the taxpayer realized on the
sale. The case now before us presents the question whether the
same rule applies when the unpaid amount of the nonrecourse
mortgage exceeds the fair market value of the property sold. 2
Over a decade earlier, Lou had tackled the Crane case,
and in his piece had suggested, albeit without substantial
elaboration, that the answer to the Tufts question was to be
found in the tax benefit rule.3
Eight years later, still many years before Tufts, Lou
nailed the point down, as part of his tour de force on sales
and exchanges in the Buffalo Law Review 4:
[Where] the amount of non-recourse debt ... exceeds the value of
the encumbered property .... there has been realized a benefit in
the amount of such excess, but such benefit arises from past
depreciation of cost basis arising from the mortgage or from
borrowing on the value of the property. Both the depreciation and
the borrowing give the taxpayer untaxed cash that should in some
manner be included in his gross income. However, where the
mortgage can be satisfied only from the property, the excess
amount is not a benefit received because of relief from the
mortgage. Therefore the excess should not be part of the amount
realized from a sale or other disposition of the property, since it is
outside the ambit of section 1001(b). And, absent personal liability
for the mortgage, the amount of ruch excess cannot be taxed as
2. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 301-02 (1983) (citation omitted).
3. Louis A. Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current
View of Some Tax Effects of Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 85-86
(1969). The suggestion was not lost on Professor Boris Bittker. See Boris I.
Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX. L. REV.
277, 285 n.14 (1978).
4. Louis A. Del Cotto, Sales and Other Dispositions of Property Under
Section 1001: The Taxable Event, Amount Realized and Related Problems of
Basis, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 219 (1977).
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debt-discharge income.
The appropriate remedy, therefore, would appear to lie in the
application of the tax benefit rule. The taxpayer has received the
benefit of the mortgage, either as cost basis giving him tax-free
cash through depreciation deductions or as a result of tax-free
borrowing on the value of the property. Therefore, transfer of the
property is the proper occasion to make him account for such past
tax benefit by including the excess of debt over property value in
his gross income as gain from past depreciation deductions or from
past tax free borrowing ....
... When the property is disposed of, it becomes clear that the
transferor will not pay the amount of the mortgage in excess of his
adjusted basis, which amount supported previous depreciation
deductions, and therefore the proper tax benefit should be
recaptured by the tax benefit rule. Similar reasoning applies if the
mortgage secures a borrowing by taxpayer on any appreciation in
the property. When on conveyance of the property it becomes clear
that the borrowing will not be repaid, the tax benefit received from
the prior tax-free borrowing should be recaptured even though it
does not arise from the sale of property whose value has fallen
below the amount of a non-recourse mortgage.
5
On March 7, 1983 the Supreme Court decided Hillsboro
National Bank v. Commissioner,6 and for the first time,
definitively explained and approved the tax-benefit rule in
the following language: "The basic purpose of the tax
benefit rule is to achieve rough transactional parity in tax
. ..and to protect the Government and the taxpayer from
the adverse effects of reporting a transaction on the basis of
assumptions that an event in a subsequent year proves to
have been erroneous."7
Less than two months later-on May 2, 1983-the
Court decided Tufts in favor of the Government, holding
that the amount realized on the disposition of the property
must include the face amount of the non-recourse mortgage
even though it exceeds the value of the mortgaged property.
The Court explained:
5. Id. at 322-32.
6. 460 U.S. 370 (1983)
7. Id. at 383.
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The rationale for this treatment is that the original inclusion of
the amount of the mortgage in basis rested on the assumption that
the mortgagor incurred an obligation to repay. Moreover, this
treatment balances the fact that the mortgagor originally received
the proceeds of the nonrecourse loan tax-free on the same
assumption. Unless the outstanding amount of the mortgage is
deemed to be realized, the mortgagor effectively will have received
untaxed income at the time the loan was extended and will have
received an unwarranted increase in the basis of his property.8
Now, I ask you, does that not sound just like the tax-
benefit rule? And, more relevantly, does it not sound to you
just like Lou Del Cotto in the Buffalo Law Review in 1977,
especially in light of the above-quoted basic rationale of the
tax-benefit rule given in Hillsboro? Would you not,
therefore, expect from the Tufts court a citation somewhat
like "See Del Cotto, etc., etc."? What followed immediately
however, was not such a citation, but a begrudging
footnote 8:
"Although the Crane rule has some affinity with the tax benefit
rule, see Bittker, supra, at 283; Del Cotto, Sales and Other
Dispositions of Property Under Section 1001: The Taxable Event,
Amount Realized and Related Problems of Basis, 26 Buffalo L.
Rev. 219, 323-324 (1977), the analysis we adopt is different [sic].
Our analysis applies even in the situation to which no deductions
are taken. [Does the Hillsboro formulation distinguish between the
tax benefit of a deduction and that of an exclusion?] It focuses on
the obligation to repay and its subsequent extinguishment, not on
the taking and recovers of deductions. [Did you not just say that
the focus was on an "assumption'I See generally Note, 82 Colum.
L. Rev., at 1526-1529."9
Well, Lou, you had to be satisfied with "some affinity."
You did not get the consanguinity you deserved. And, like
Scott Norwood after Super Bowl XXV, you took it without
whining. But "we" all know that you were not wide right-
that you were right down the middle, and that footnote 8 in
Tufts will eventually suffer the same fate as footnote 37 in
Crane. Until then, of course, the whole episode will continue
to serve the overriding purpose of your teaching and
scholarship-to challenge, to discover, to reveal.
8. 461 U.S. 300, 309 (1983).
9. Id. at 310 n.8 (bracketed italics added.)
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I conclude on the upbeat: I thank my esteemed
colleague publicly for the intellectual ride we had together,
both in class and on paper. 10 It began with that first
summer before I started teaching tax, when he spent
countless hours giving unselfishly of the insights he had
gained over many years of thinking and teaching. It
continued until the end, and although my debt to him may
be non-recourse, it is-as he taught us that Crane taught-
every bit as real as is the debt my wife Rita and I owe Lou's
wife Bea for, inter multa alia, the meat ball recipe, and as
are the debts my children Mary and Michael owe "Aunt
Bea" and "Uncle Lou" for being their proxy Godparents and
for being a loving part of their Buffalo family.
10. See generally Louis A. Del Cotto & Kenneth F. Joyce, Taxation of the Trust
Annuity: The Unitrust Under the Constitution and the Internal Revenue Code, 23
TAX L. REV. 257 (1968); Kenneth F. Joyce & Louis A. Del Cotto, The AB (ABC) and
BA Transactions: An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out
Income Interests, 31 TA L. REV. 121 (1976); Louis A. Del Cotto & Kenneth F.
Joyce, Inherited Excess Mortgage Property: Death and the Inherited Tax Shelter,
34 TAX L. REV. 569 (1979); Louis A. Del Cotto & Kenneth F. Joyce, Interest-Free
Loans: The Odyssey of a Misnomer, 35 TAX L. REV. 459 (1980); Louis A. Del Cotto &
Kenneth F. Joyce, Interest-Free Loans and Dickman v. Commissioner: A Letter to
the Supreme Court, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 589 (1984), reprinted in TAX NOTES, June
4, 1984.
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